Quantum Computing Could Break Bitcoin-Like Encryption Far Easier Than Intially Thought, Google Researcher Says
A groundbreaking research paper by Google Quantum AI researcher Craig Gidney reveals that breaking RSA encryption, a cornerstone of data security, may require significantly fewer quantum computing resources than previously anticipated. While not directly targeting Bitcoin (BTC) or other cryptocurrencies, the implications are substantial. RSA, a public-key encryption algorithm, relies on a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption. Bitcoin, however, utilizes elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), a different but similarly vulnerable system.
Both RSA and ECC are susceptible to Shor’s algorithm, a quantum algorithm capable of factoring large numbers and solving discrete logarithm problems—the foundations of public-key cryptography. ECC, despite employing smaller keys than RSA, remains vulnerable to quantum attacks. Gidney’s revised estimates drastically reduce the quantum resources needed to break a 2048-bit RSA key: from a previous projection of 20 million noisy qubits and eight hours to under a million qubits and less than a week. This represents a 20-fold decrease in qubit requirements.
It’s crucial to understand that a quantum computer capable of such feats doesn’t yet exist. Current leading quantum processors, like IBM’s Condor (over 1,100 qubits) and Google’s Sycamore (53 qubits), are significantly less powerful. Quantum computing’s power stems from qubits, which unlike traditional bits, can represent both 0 and 1 simultaneously due to quantum superposition and entanglement. This enables parallel computation, tackling problems intractable for classical computers.
The implications for cryptocurrency security are significant. Research groups, such as Project 11, are actively probing the vulnerability of even weakened versions of Bitcoin’s ECC encryption using existing quantum hardware. Project 11’s public bounty program offers 1 BTC for successfully breaking small ECC keys (1-25 bits), aiming to gauge the proximity of current quantum capabilities to breaking real-world cryptographic systems. While breaking Bitcoin’s encryption isn’t currently feasible, Gidney’s research underscores the need for proactive measures to prepare for the potential threat of future, more powerful quantum computers.




